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OHIO STATE  UNIVERSITY 
Inflation  Indicators  and  Inflation  Policy 
1.  Introduction 
Since  late  1979,  the  goal  of  monetary  policy  in  the  United  States  has 
progressively  shifted  toward  the reduction  of the level  and variation of 
inflation.  Recent policy  actions  serve to highlight  the desire of the Fed- 
eral Reserve  to keep  inflation  both  low  and stable,  while  downplaying 
the  likely  output  and  employment  consequences.  The purpose  of this 
paper is to evaluate  the practicality and desirability of inflation targeting. 
Any attempt to control the path of the aggregate price level has several 
critical aspects.  First, policy makers must be able to forecast inflation. To 
run a proactive policy that controls prices, it is crucial that one be able to 
assess  the future path of prices in the absence  of any immediate  policy 
action.  In  other  words,  given  some  candidate  inflation  indicator,  the 
relationship  between  future inflation  and the indicator must  be known 
with  some  degree  of accuracy. This leads to the first major question: Are 
there any useful indicators of future inflation? If, for example,  we see the 
level of capacity utilization or the price of gold rise, can this be translated 
into a forecast for the aggregate  price level? 
Once prices are forecast to rise above a target path, the next step is to 
figure out what  to do about it. But the extent of a response  requires an 
accurate estimate  of the impact of the policy instrument  on inflation. Is it 
possible  to estimate  the  effect  of policy  actions  on  prices? What is the 
precision  of the estimates? 
Finally,  given  the  estimated  response  of  prices  to  both  exogenous 
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shocks and policy, and an objective for the policy makers, it is possible  to 
formulate policy rules. With these in hand,  a series of practical questions 
can be addressed.  First, how  quickly and by how  much  should  policy 
react to perceived upward price pressures? What are the quantitative ben- 
efits of price-level  targeting on the variance of inflation, and what are its 
costs in terms of increased variation of output? And finally, what are the 
consequences  of shifting  from price-level  to nominal-income  targeting? 
The primary focus  of this  paper is on inflation.  This can be justified 
by  the  fact  that  the  reduced-form  representation  of  a broad  class  of 
macroeconomic  models  depends  only  on  inflation.  A  simple  example 
can  be  constructed  by  starting  with  a  standard  staggered  contract 
model  in  which  nominal  shocks  have  real effects  that die  out  slowly.1 
Assume  that  the  monetary  authority  minimizes  a  loss  function  that 
depends  on  current  and  future  deviations  of  output  (Yt)  from its  full- 
employment  level  (y*), as well as inflation (Xr).  This formulation ignores 
dynamic  consistency  problems,  as it implicitly  assumes  that the loss  is 
minimized  at y  =  y*.2  Fixed  nominal  prices  that  change  infrequently 
imply that output  deviations  are a distributed lag of unanticipated  infla- 
tion,  and  so  the  loss  function  can be written  in terms of inflation  and 
expected  inflation  alone.  It immediately  follows  that the optimal  long- 
run policy  objective  should  be zero inflation.  The dependence  of policy 
on expectations  only affects optimal disinflationary  paths. 
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  divided  into  five  sections.  Section  2 
discusses  the difficulties  facing policy makers in their attempt to control 
high-  and  medium-frequency  fluctuations  in the  aggregate  price level. 
While evidence  suggests  that a k-percent rule may work well for control- 
ling inflation in the long run (at horizons  of five to ten years or more), it 
may result in substantial  swings  in prices over horizons  of two  or three 
years.  This leads  to an examination  of a more sophisticated  approach in 
which  one first tries to forecast the path of inflation, and then formulates 
a reaction  function  to control it. Sections  3 and 4 examine  different  as- 
pects  of  the  forecasting  problem,  while  Sections  5 and  6 study  policy 
reaction  functions.  In Section  3 two  sets  of results  are presented.  The 
first examines  commercial  forecasts  from various  sources.  This  is  fol- 
lowed  by an examination  of the reduced-form correlations between  infla- 
tion  and  various  candidate  indicators.  Section  4  examines  structural 
changes  in the relationship  between  inflation and the indicators. Section 
1. Examples  of such  models  are numerous.  See for example  the one  in Ball and Cecchetti 
(1988). 
2. Since price rigidity in staggered  contract models  usually results from monopolistic  com- 
petition,  social welfare will not in general be maximized  at the general equilibrium level 
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5 looks  closely  at the  relationship  between  monetary  policy  and  infla- 
tion,  and  Section  6 chooses  a particular model  to study  optimal  policy 
responses.  Section  7 offers conclusions. 
To anticipate  the conclusions,  I find that inflation is extremely difficult 
to forecast at horizons  of even  one quarter. One of the likely reasons  for 
this is the fact that the relationship  between  inflation and various candi- 
date  indicators  exhibits  rather frequent  structural breaks.  Beyond  the 
forecasting  problem,  I find  that the  relationship  between  inflation  and 
policy is also difficult to estimate.  Together, these lead to the final result: 
Shifting from price level to nominal-income  targeting yields a substantial 
gain in real-income  stabilization,  while  resulting  in only  a small loss  in 
increased  aggregate  price variability. 
2.  The  Nature  of the  Problem 
The apparent stability of long-run money  demand  functions  implies that 
a Friedman-style  k-percent rule for money  growth could be used to reach 
either a long-run  inflation or a long-run nominal GDP target.3 But recent 
experience  teaches  that monetary  policy  aimed  at controlling  short-run 
movements  in nominal  variables faces formidable problems. 
Figure  1 plots  the  nominal  GDP velocity  of the  monetary  base,  M1, 
and M2, from the first quarter of 1959 through the third quarter of 1994. 
The data are standardized  by removing  a trend,  subtracting the sample 
mean,  and dividing  by the sample standard deviation.4 For the monetary 
base  and  M1,  the  trend  has  a break in  1986.5 These  data suggest  two 
things.  First, the short-run instability in velocity  has increased  substan- 
tially over the past decade.  Second,  over the past two years, the velocity 
of M2 has  increased  dramatically, while  that of the monetary  base  and 
M1 has  declined.6  If one  were  to try to formulate  a k-percent rule,  the 
question  would  be: k percent of what? 
3. See,  for example,  Lucas (1988), Hallman,  Porter, and  Small (1991), Stock and  Watson 
(1993), and Feldstein  and Stock (1994), among  others. 
4. The standardization  makes the reported values  similar to coefficients  from a regression 
of the detrended  log of nominal GDP on the detrended  log of money. 
5. The  location  of  the  break was  determined  using  the  Andrews  (1993)-Quandt  (1960) 
'sup' test,  robust to heteroscedasticity.  For the monetary base,  the break is estimated  to 
occur in 1986:04, whereas  for M1 the estimated  break is in 1986:02. Obviously,  real-time 
policy making  would  not have been able to take advantage  of the shift that we can now 
estimate.  This makes matters even  worse  than they appear here. 
6. The use of M2 encounters  the additional problem of the changes  in definition  over time. 
Recently,  Duca  (1992) has  suggested  including  the  stock  of bond  mutual  funds  in  a 
revised  measure.  A very skeptical way to view  these modifications  is to observe that M2 
seems  to be constructed  so that its implied  velocity  is stationary about a constant  mean 
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Figure  1 GDP VELOCITY  OF THE  MONETARY  BASE,  M1 AND M2 
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The implication  of the recent instability in velocity  is that it is hard to 
know  how  to run policy at high frequencies.  To put it slightly differently, 
most  economists  would  agree  that if the  monetary  base  grows  at 10% 
rather than at 5%, then inflation will be higher in the long run. But this 
tells  us  very  little  about  how  the  monetary  authority  should  act on  a 
month-to-month  basis.  A  natural  response  to  this  is  to  seek  a  more 
sophisticated  feedback  rule that incorporates  inflation,  inflation indica- 
tors, and policy variables. That is the task addressed  in the remainder of 
this paper. 
3.  Forecasting  Inflation 
The first step in formulating  any policy aimed at reducing  the level and 
variance of inflation is to forecast the evolution  of aggregate  prices both 
with  and  without  policy  interventions.  The next  two  sections  examine 
our  ability  to  forecast  inflation,  and  the  following  sections  report evi- 
dence  on the impact of policy changes  on prices. Since economic  theory 
implies  that  different  indicators  should  forecast  inflation  at  different Inflation  Indicators  and  Inflation  Policy  *  193 
horizons,  I present  results for forecasts of inflation over future periods of 
varying length.7 
Section  3.1 examines  the accuracy of contemporaneous  inflation fore- 
casts.  Section  3.2  reports  evidence  on  the  simple  correlation between 
indicators and inflation.  Section 3.3 evaluates  forecasts of inflation based 
on the indicators. 
3.1 CONTEMPORANEOUS  FORECASTS 
There are several readily available sources for the history of commercial 
inflation  forecasts.  Table 1 reports  the  root-mean-square  error of  the 
quarterly  and  annual  forecasts  published  by  Data  Resources  Incorpo- 
rated (DRI) and the consensus  forecast from Blue Chip Economic Indica- 
tors. For comparison,  the table also reports the results of using  a simple 
random-walk  model  for inflation.  This  "naive" method  takes  current 
inflation as the forecast for all horizons. 
Since forecasters report their expectations  of the path for the price level 
into the future, it is possible  to construct estimates  of a term structure of 
expected  future prices. Defining  Et[Trt+,  t+k] as the expectation at t of infla- 
tion from t + I to t + k-the  analog to a forward interest rate-we  are able 
to compute  the accuracy of inflation forecasts for various horizons. 
The results in the table suggest  several conclusions.  First, while always 
better than the benchmark naive  forecasts,  the commercial forecasts are 
very  poor,  even  at a one-quarter  horizon.  For example,  the root-mean- 
square  error  of DRI's  one-quarter-ahead  forecast  (Et[rt,  t+l])  for 1982:01  to 
1994:03 is 1.54,  implying  a 70% confidence  interval of three percentage 
points  and a 90% confidence  interval in excess of five percentage  points! 
The Blue Chip consensus  forecast is only marginally more accurate (per- 
haps because  it begins  only in 1985). 
Second,  the  accuracy of the DRI forecasts declines  as the horizon  in- 
creases. This is particularly true for the early part of the sample, which in- 
cludes the large oil price shocks of the middle and late 1970s. But even over 
the past dozen years, the inaccuracy of the forecasts increases with the hori- 
zon,  rising by one-third  as the horizon  increases  from 1 to 10 quarters. 
The table reports results for one-year  forecasts,  out up to three years. 
The  results  do  show  that  the  RMSE of the  forecast  one  year ahead  is 
quite  a bit  smaller  than  that  of  the  forecast  one  quarter ahead.  This 
suggests  that forecasters might get the general trend in inflation roughly 
correct, while  missing  high-frequency  movements  that are subsequently 
reversed.  Nevertheless,  the  forecasts  still seem  very inaccurate,  imply- 
ing 90% confidence  intervals for one-year-ahead  inflation of more than 3 
percentage  points. 
7. Ball and Cecchetti  (1990) make a similar point. Table 1  ROOT-MEAN-SQUARE ERROR OF PUBLISHED FORECASTS 
Data Resources 
1970 Q2  1970 Q2  1982 Q1 
to 1994 Q3  to 1981 Q4  to 1994 Q3  Horizon 
(Quarters):  Actual  Naive  Actual  Naive  Actual  Naive 
Et[rt,t+-l]:  1.67  1.98  1.80  2.09  1.54  1.88 
EtJ[t+l,t+2]:  2.30  2.53  2.77  2.80  1.75  2.26 
Et[7rt+2,t+3]:  2.52  2.49  3.07  2.87  1.86  2.08 
Et[TTt+3,t+4]:  2.80  3.01  3.52  3.54  1.86  2.39 
Et[7rt+4,t+5]'  3.13  3.39  4.03  4.20  1.86  2.36 
Et[,t+5,t+6]:  3.26  3.52  4.20  4.56  1.92  2.00 
Et[7tt+6,t+7]'  3.48  3.87  4.57  5.05  1.77  2.07 
Et[7rt+7,t+8]'  3.86  4.26  5.03  5.49  1.98  2.36 
Et[^Tt+8,t+9]'  3.64  4.28  4.87  5.66  1.96  2.42 
Et[TTt+9,t+lo]  '  3.43  4.14  4.84  5.78  2.00  2.51 
Et[8't+lO,t+ll]:  3.46  4.03  5.05  5.92  2.14  2.47 
Et[Trt+ll,t+12]:  3.67  4.47  5.74  7.17  2.03  2.24 
Mean inflation:  5.54  7.66  3.63 
St. dev.:  10.50  10.76  2.57 
1970 Q2  1970 Q2  1982 Q1 
to 1994 Q3  to 1981 Q4  to 1994 Q3  Horizon 
(Years):  Actual  Naive  Actual  Naive  Actual  Naive 
Et[rt,t+4]:  1.79  2.13  2.32  2.43  1.06  1.79 
Et[rt+4,t+81]  3.09  3.54  4.09  4.57  1.46  1.95 
Et['t+8,t+l2]:  3.48  4.13  5.65  6.61  1.61  2.06 
Blue Chip 
1985 Q1 
Horizon  to 1994 Q3  Horizon 
(Quarters):  Actual  Naive 
Et[Trt,  t+l]:  1.20  1.66 
Et[ rt+l ,+2]:  1.56  1.96 
Et[Tt+2,t+3]:  1.64  1.97 
Et[ rt+3,  +4]:  1.69  2.26 
Et[Wrt+4,t+5]:  1.76  2.21 
Mean inflation:  3.64 
St. dev.:  2.69 
Horizon  1985 Q1 
(Years):  to 1994 Q3 
Actual  Naive 
Et[Tt,  t+4]:  1.02  1.65 
Root-mean-square  errors of "actual" forecasts  are computed  from published  information.  Root-mean- 
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3.2 CORRELATION  OF INFLATION  WITH 
CANDIDATE  INDICATORS 
The next  step  is to examine  how  well  different candidate  indicators are 
correlated  with  inflation.  To do  this,  I estimate  the  following  simple 
regression: 
Tt+l,  t+k=a(L)Trt_l  +  b(L)xt_, +  Et(l, k),  (1) 
where  Tt+l, t+k is inflation from t + I to t + k, 7rrt_  is inflation from t -  2 to t 
-  1, x is a candidate  indicator, a(L) and b(L)  are lag polynominals  of order 
6, and Et  is a stationary moving  average error of order k -  1 with i.n.i.d. 
innovations.8 
Following  the  work  of  Niemira  and  Klein  (1994),  Webb and  Rowe 
(1994),  and  others,  the  xs  were  chosen  to  include  several  commodity 
price indices,  the  price  of gold,  the  price of oil,  monetary  aggregates, 
interest  rates,  interest-rate  spreads,  a wage  index,  the  trade-weighted 
exchange  rate, a weekly  hours index,  the employment  population  ratio, 
capacity utilization,  and unemployment.9  For the monthly  sample begin- 
ning  in January 1967, the  set includes  seventeen  candidate  variables.10 
Table 2 reports  results  from estimating  (1) for three horizons-1  year 
ahead  (k =  12,  1 =  0),  1 to 2 years  ahead  (k =  24,  1 =  12),  and  3 to 4 years 
ahead (k = 48, 1 = 36)-over  two sample periods,  1967:01 to 1994:07 and 
1982:01 to 1994:07. The numbers in the table are the p-values for the Wald 
form of the test that all of the elements  of b(L) are zero simultaneously, 
computed  using  a covariance  matrix that is robust to heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation.11 
For the  most  part,  both  real variables,  such  as  unemployment  and 
capacity  utilization,  and  material  prices,  such  as  the  two  spot-price 
indices  and  the  prices  of  gold  or oil,  are correlated  with  inflation  at 
horizons  of 1 or 2 years,  but not at horizons  of 3 to 4 years. The same is 
not true for the National  Association  of Purchasing Managers  diffusion 
8. The  order  of  the  lag  polynomial  was  chosen  to  enable  estimation  in  the  following 
section.  Where  they  could  be computed,  results  were  shown  to be equivalent  to those 
using  12 lags. 
9. It is worth  noting  that there is a vast literature on forecasting  inflation  turning points. 
This  work  employs  techniques  that are similar to that used  in general  business-cycle 
forecasting,  and so is a bit removed  from the work here. See Webb and Rowe (1994) and 
the citations  therein. 
10. Inflation is measured  using  the All Items CPI-U with  rental equivalence.  From 1967 to 
1982,  this  is  the  experimental  'CPI-U X1'. All  of  the  results  are robust  to  using  the 
weighted-median  CPI described  in Bryan and Cecchetti (1994). 
11. The covariance matrix of the estimated  coefficients  is calculated using Newey  and West 
(1987), with  lags equal to 1.33k. 196 *  CECCHETTI 
Table  2  CORRELATION  OF INFLATION  WITH  VARIOUS  INDICATORS 
p-Value 
3 mo  1 yr  1-2 yr  3-4 yr 
J. of comm. indus. mater. 
NAPM spot index 
NAPM diffusion index 
Price  of gold, London fix 
Price  of oil, Brent  North crude 
Average hourly earnings 
Exchange  rate 
Monetary  base 
M1l 
M2 
Federal  funds rate rff 
10-yr-bond-rff  spread 
Commercial  paper-rff  spread 
Weekly hours index 
Capacity  utilization 
Unemployment rate 
Employment  population ratio 
J. of comm. indus. mater. 
NAPM spot index 
NAPM diffusion index 
Price  of gold, London fix 
Price  of oil, Brent  North crude 
Average hourly earnings 
Exchange  rate 
Monetary  base 
M1l 
M2 
Federal  funds rate rff 
10-yr-bond-rff  spread 
Commercial  paper-rff  spread 
Weekly hours index 
Capacity  utilization 
Unemployment rate 



































Sample  1967:01-1994:07 
0.00  0.01 
0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.02 
0.00  0.00 
0.11  0.68 
0.19  0.18 
0.24  0.26 
0.25  0.66 
0.72  0.90 
0.08  0.02 
0.00  0.00 
0.05  0.01 
0.01  0.00 
0.02  0.00 
0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00 
0.01  0.00 
Sample  1982:01-1994:07 
0.04  0.01 
0.11  0.06 
0.00  0.02 
0.61  0.75 
0.61  0.64 
0.64  0.02 
0.86  0.80 
0.34  0.98 
0.12  0.47 
0.00  0.66 
0.00  0.89 
0.00  0.00 
0.56  0.09 
0.69  0.76 
0.03  0.20 
0.00  0.18 
0.05  0.70 
index,  the average-hourly-earnings  index,  the weekly-hours  index,  and 
the  employment-population  ratio,  which  do  have  predictive  power  at 
the  longer  horizon.  Increasing  the  horizon  to 5 years  does  not change 
the results. 
It is worthwhile  examining  the case of capacity utilization in more de- 



































0.00 Inflation  Indicators  and  Inflation  Policy  *  197 
zero simultaneously,  it is possible to calculate the sum of the coefficients- 
b(1).12  Interestingly, an increase in capacity utilization is correlated with an 
increase in inflation at horizons of up to 3 years. For example, the t-ratio of 
b(1) in the (k = 24, 1 = 12) case is + 6.97. But after that, at horizons of 3 and 
4 years,  b(1) is  negative-for  (k =  48,  1 =  36) it is  -  1.98. 
The results for the different sample periods are dramatically different. 
For the more recent period (1982-1994),  very few variables help forecast 
inflation  at a 1-year horizon,  but most  seem  to be useful  at longer hori- 
zons.  This is likely the result of the relatively small amount  of indepen- 
dent information  used  in the longer-horizon  estimates. 
The main conclusion  to be drawn from these simple correlations is that 
the  different  indicators  provide  information  about inflation  at different 
horizons,  and that the information  has changed  over time.13 
3.3 INFLATION  INDICATORS  AND INFLATION  FORECASTING 
The simple regressions  of the previous  section may not be representative 
of the  actual ability of an indicator to forecast inflation.  Within-sample 
statistics  suffer  from  standard  overfitting  problems.  These  can be  ad- 
dressed  by constructing  out-of-sample  forecasts. I do this with a series of 
rolling regressions,  in which  an equation  is estimated  over a sample  of 
fixed length,  a one-period-ahead  forecast is computed,  the next observa- 
tion in the sample  is added  and the last one dropped,  and the process is 
repeated.  Table 3 reports  the  results  from two  such  experiments.  The 
first uses  a 10-year sample beginning  in 1967, while  the second  employs 
a 5-year window  with data beginning  in 1982. Again, the calculations are 
done  for forecasts  at various  horizons.  In addition  to reporting the sim- 
ple root-mean-square  error of the forecasts,  the table includes  the rank 
correlation  between  the  RMSE of  a model  and  its  Bayes  Information 
Criterion (BIC) for the initial sample.14 
12. There are a number  of well-known  pitfalls associated  with  the  interpretation  of b(1). 
Unless  the sample  includes  periods  in which  capacity utilization  movements  are sus- 
tained  for a number  of months,  then  the  sum  of the coefficients  is not a meaningful 
thing to compute.  See Fisher and Seater (1993) for a discussion  of related issues. 
13. A similar result emerges  from a more complex  (and computationally  intensive)  exercise 
of  estimating  and  ranking  all of  the  possible  models  with  all subsets  of  seventeen 
indicator variables.  Using  the Bayes information  criterion (see  footnote  14 below)  as a 
ranking criterion,  substantially  different models  are chosen  for different horizons  and 
sample  periods.  For example,  using  the entire sample  period and a horizon  of twelve 
months,  the  preferred  model  includes  the  NAPM  spot  index,  the  price  of  oil,  M2, 
capacity utilization,  and  unemployment  rate. But for a 36-month  horizon  and the full 
1967:01-1994:07 sample  the "best" model  includes  only M2 and the federal funds  rate. 
14. For a model  with p parameters estimated  over a sample of length  T, the BIC is defined 
as [In o  + p/T  lnT], where  oC is the error variance. These statistics,  which  are sinrilar to 
an adjusted  R2, are only suggestive,  as their relevance has been established  only for the 
case in which  the regression  error process is not serially correlated. 198 * CECCHETTI 
Table 3  ROOT-MEAN-SQUARE ERRORS  IN ONE-STEP AHEAD ROLLING 
FORECASTS 
Sample  1967:01-1994:07, 10-yr Window 
Indicator  3 mo  1 yr  1-2  yr  3-4  yr 
CPI only  2.14  1.70  2.39  2.50 
J. of comm.  indus.  mater.  2.15  1.64  2.38  2.63 
NAPM spot index  2.07  1.63  2.36  2.60 
NAPM diffusion  index  2.09  1.48  2.19  2.54 
Price of gold,  London  fix  2.24  1.68  2.35  2.73 
Price of oil, Brent North crude  2.35  1.73  2.43  2.61 
Average  hourly earnings  2.09  1.71  2.43  2.44 
Exchange rate  2.24  1.71  2.27  2.63 
Monetary base  2.14  1.64  2.27  2.55 
M1  2.25  1.73  2.45  2.48 
M2  2.22  1.79  2.47  2.67 
Federal funds  rate rff  2.27  1.77  2.05  1.90 
10-yr-bond-rff spread  2.13  1.77  2.22  2.53 
Commercial-paper-rff  spread  2.27  1.87  2.25  2.19 
Weekly  hours index  2.28  1.81  2.34  2.08 
Capacity utilization  2.14  1.52  2.24  2.83 
Unemployment  rate  2.20  1.65  2.33  2.89 
Employment  population  ratio  2.27  1.75  2.52  2.17 
Rank correlation of initial sample  -  0.13  0.15  0.01  0.00 
BIC with RMSE  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25) 
Sample  1982:01-1994:07, 5-yr Window 
Indicator 
CPI only  1.54  1.28  1.43 
J. of comm. indus. mater.  1.60  1.45  1.30 
NAPM spot index  1.72  1.45  1.39 
NAPM diffusion index  1.70  1.42  1.49 
Price of gold, London  fix  1.60  1.35  1.68 
Price of oil, Brent North crude  1.95  1.50  1.72 
Average  hourly earnings  1.65  1.32  1.47 
Exchange  rate  1.64  1.38  1.56 
Monetary base  1.68  1.14  1.61 
Ml  1.54  1.08  1.58 
M2  1.55  1.16  1.32 
Federal  funds rate rff  1.43  1.16  0.97 
10-yr bond-rff  spread  1.43  0.90  1.30 
Commercial-paper-rff  spread  1.61  1.35  1.48 
Weekly  hours index  1.59  1.17  1.22 
Capacity  utilization  1.56  1.06  1.03 
Unemployment  rate  1.45  0.80  1.07 
Employment  population  ratio  1.28  0.77  1.12 
Rank  correlation  of initial sample  -  0.10  -  0.03  -  0.22 
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The first line in each panel  of the table reports the results of forecast- 
ing  inflation  using  inflation  alone.  As  is clear, additional  variables  can 
easily worsen  the forecast. For example,  when  forecasting inflation from 
3  to  4  years  into  the  future,  the  addition  of  eleven  of  the  seventeen 
indicators raises the root-mean-square-forecast  error. Adding  any of the 
price  measures  worsens  the  forecasts.  Only  the  wage  index,  M1,  the 
federal  funds  rate,  the  commercial  paper  spread,  the weekly  hours  in- 
dex,  and  the  employment  population  ratio  improve  the  forecast.  At 
shorter horizons  things are a bit better. Regardless of the sample period, 
only eight of the seventeen  variables worsen  forecasts over the next year. 
A number of other interesting  results emerge from this exercise.  First, 
with the exception  of the 3-month horizon,  this forecasting method  com- 
pares  favorably  with  the  commercial  forecasts,  though  both  are rather 
poor. Second,  there is virtually no correlation between  the ranking of the 
models  by their RMSEs and their initial sample BICs.15  Whether a model 
fits  well  in  sample  tells  us  virtually  nothing  about  its  out-of-sample 
forecasting  ability. 
4.  Structural  Breaks  in the  Inflation  Process 
A natural conclusion  to draw from the simple examination of the previous 
section is that the inflation process is changing over time. If these changes 
were  gradual,  then  the  rolling-sample  procedures  used  in  Section  3.3 
might take care of the problem.  But there is a good reason to believe  that 
this will  not be the case,  and that the correlation between  inflation and 
candidate  indicators,  the x's, will display  structural breaks.16 
It is  straightforward  to  see  why  this  might  happen.  For the  sake  of 
discussion,  assume  that inflation is actually determined  by the following 
"structural" model: 
7t+l  =  a(L)r,  +  3(L)Xt +  wt+,,  (2) 
where,  rt is "policy," and Xt is a vector of determinants. 
Next write the policy reaction function as 
rt =  y(L)Xt +  vt.  (3) 
15. Miyao (1994, Chapter  3) reports  a similar  result for the relationship  between real and 
monetary  variables. 
16. A number  of researchers  have modeled changes  in the inflation  process. Caskey  (1985) 
examines  a linear  model with Bayesian  learning,  and Evans  and Wachtel  (1993)  investi- 
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The  role  of  the  policy  maker  is  to  choose  y(L), the  reaction  of  rt, to 
observed  Xs. Since y(L) can contain zeros,  a policy regime need not react 
to every element  in X. 
Now  consider  the reduced-form  regression: 
rt+l  =  R(L)Xt +  r7t.  (4) 
Since 
R(L)  =  a(L)y(L  )  +  3(L),  (5) 
changes  in policy, which  are changes  in y(L), will change  the correlation 
between  X and  w. In effect,  the reduced-form  inflation regressions  sub- 
sume  the monetary  policy  reaction function  (3), and so a change  in the 
monetary  authority's  policy rule-which  may be a change in the relative 
weight  placed on various indicators-will  cause changes  in (4).17 
Note  also that if the policy  objective  is to minimize  Var (Trr),  then  the 
optimal policy reaction function  sets y(L) =  -  a(L)-1/3(L)  and so inflation 
is uncorrelated with its determinants.  This is one version of a point made 
by  Kareken  and  Solow  (1963) and  Sims  (1972), and  more  recently  by 
Woodford (1994). 
This suggests  looking  for structural breaks in the relationship between 
inflation  and  indicators.  Shifts  should  occur  near  the  times  at which 
monetary  policy  procedures  changed.  To do this,  I examine  regressions 
of inflation 1 year ahead on candidate indicators-equation  (1) in Section 
3.2 with  (I = 0, k =  12)-using  a combination  of the Andrews-Ploberger 
(1994)  exponential  Wald  tests  for  structural  stability,  and  Andrews 
(1993)-Quandt  (1960) tests. 
The Andrews-Quandt  test is the maximum value of the statistic associ- 
ated  with  the  test that a break occurred at each point  in the sample.  It 
provides  an  estimate  of  the  break date  itself.  The Andrews-Ploberger 
test  is  an  exponentially  weighted  average  of  the  statistics  assuming  a 
break at each date in the sample; it tests for structural stability generally. 
Calculation  of  the  second  of  these  requires  the  choice  of  a truncation 
parameter (r) denoting  the proportion of the beginning  and of the end of 
the  sample  not  to  be  used  in  the  computations.  The  results  reported 
below  choose  r to be the  same  proportion  at the beginning  and end  of 
the sample,  and equal to the number of right-hand-side  variables plus 12 
months,  divided  by the sample  size. 
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As  it is currently worked  out,  the econometric  theory  that forms the 
basis for these  tests presumes  that there is a single structural break in the 
relation  under  study.  Since  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  the 
monetary  policy  process  has  changed  more  than  once  over  the  1967- 
1994 sample,  one  would  like a procedure  that suggests  more than one 
break date.  To do this,  I have  employed  these  tests in a recursive man- 
ner. If the Andrews-Ploberger  test rejects structural stability at the 5% 
level,  then  the  sample  is  split  at  the  date  implied  by  the  Andrews- 
Quandt  test.18 Assuming  that  enough  data remain-in  the  results  re- 
ported  here,  the sample  must be a minimum  of 3 years long-the  tests 
are run again. 
The results  of this  sequential  procedure  are reported  in Table 4. The 
tests  are  robust  to  heteroscedasticity  and  serial  correlation.19 The  full 
sample  extends  from January 1967 to July 1994. In addition  to estimated 
break dates,  the  table reports  the p-values  for the Wald test  that all of 
the elements  of b(L) are zero simultaneously  for a sample beginning  the 
month  following  the  previous  break (or the beginning  of the  full sam- 
ple) until the next break (or the end of the full sample).  Since the right- 
hand-side  variable in the regressions  is inflation  over the preceding  12 
months,  these  dates  can be  interpreted  as  suggesting  a change  in the 
inflation  process  sometime  during the year following  the reported date. 
To understand  how  the table is constructed,  take the example  of the 
M2. The results  suggest  that the relationship  between  inflation and M2 
changed  four  times  over  the  sample,  with  estimated  breaks  in  April 
1972, October 1978, August  1983, and September  1989. This leaves  five 
stable subsamples:  the three between  these four dates,  the one from the 
beginning  of the sample  in January 1967 to the date of the first break in 
1972, and the final one from September  1989 to the end of the sample in 
July 1994. The results  from the Wald tests  show  that the coefficients  on 
M2  in  the  inflation  regression  are  significantly  different  from  zero  at 
standard levels  of statistical significance in all but one of the subperiods. 
For the  sample  from  1983:08 to  1989:09, the p-value  for the  test  of the 
coefficients  on M2 is only 0.08. For the remainder of the subperiods,  the 
estimated  p-value is below  0.05. 
The results  show  a number  of interesting  features.  First, all of these 
relationships  are highly  unstable,  with  a minimum  of three  estimated 
18. The p-values for these tests are constructed  using the techniques  described  in Hansen 
(1995). 
19. All test statistics  are robust to both heteroscedasticity  and serial  correlation,  using the 
Newey-West (1987)  formulation  with m =  15. The serial correlation  correction  is re- 
quired, since the estimated  regressions  make use of overlapping  data. Table 4  ESTIMATED TIMING OF STRUCTURAL BREAKS IN THE INFLATION PROCESS, FULL SAMPLE 
1967:01  to  1994:07:  T/t,t+12  =  a(L)irt_l  +  b(L)xt-1  +  et 
CPI only  72:04  79:06  82:12  86:08  90 .01 
0.58  0.93  0.00  0.25  0.33  0.77 
J. of comm.  73:12  80:12  85:09 
indus.  mater.  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.21 
NAPM spot  index  72:09  76:10  82:11  89:08 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.23  0. 12 
NAPM diffusion  index  72:10  79:01  83:08  89: 07 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0. 01 
Price of gold,  72:03  76:06  82:07  88:05 
London  fix  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.20 
Price of oil,  73:01  77:02  81:05  86:05 
Brent North  crude  0.90  0.00  0.00  0.71  0.04 
Exchange rate  72:08  75:11  81:04  89:06 
0.02  0.01  0.00  0.32  0. 58 
Average  hourly  earnings  72:08  77:01  80:12 
0.63  0.25  0.66  0.51 
Monetary base  73:12  79:02  83:06  88:07 
0.82  0.00  0.00  0.66  0. 00 ml  72:03  78:04  82:06  86:10 
0.07  0.54  0.03  0.87  0.00 
M2  72:04  78:10  83:08  89:09 
0.00  0.00  0.04  0.08  0.00 
Federal funds  rate rff  72:10  76:03  80:02  85:04  89:09 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.39  0.00 
10-yr-bond-rff  72:09  76:03  80:11  85:02  89:02 
spread  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Commercial-Paper-rff  72:10  78:12  83:04  89:07 
spread  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.57  0.00 
Weekly hours  index  0.074:04  00  .  79:12  0.084:09  0.089:04 
Capacity utilization  0.072:08  0.076:01  0.080:08  0.084:07  0.089:07  00 
Unemployment  rate  0.072:09  0.076:04  0.081:04  0.585:06  0.089:09  00 
Employment  population  72:04  78:06  82:05  87 :10 
ratio  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.40  0.00 204- CECCHETTI 
breaks for a series.20 In addition,  the break dates show  a distinct pattern. 
Nearly  all of the  series  show  shifts  in early to mid-1972,  between  1979 
and 1982, and around  1989. A number of series also exhibit evidence  of 
breaks in 1976. The four real variables show  breaks in the mid-1980s as 
well. 
Several  of  these  shifts  are  as  expected,  since  they  are  around  the 
times  of the three important  changes  in Federal Reserve  operating pro- 
cedures  that occurred during the sample.  These were: (1) the 1972 shift 
from free-reserve  to federal-funds-rate  targeting,21 (2) the  1979 move  to 
a nonborrowed-reserves  operating  procedure,  and  (3) the  1982 change 
back to federal-funds-rate  targeting.22 
The p-values for the test Ho:  b = 0, where b is the vector of coefficients in 
b(L), also suggest  some  interesting  conclusions.  In only four cases-the 
NAPM  diffusion  index,  the  T-bond  spread,  capacity  utilization,  and 
weekly  hours-are  the p-values always near zero, implying that the indi- 
cators are always correlated with inflation over the next year, but that the 
correlation changes.  For the remainder,  the hypothesis  that the correla- 
tion is zero is not rejected for at least one subperiod.23 Policy makers are 
not just  changing  their emphasis  on particular indicators; during  some 
periods  they appear to be ignoring  some  of them completely. 
One  criticism  of  the  results  in  Table 4  is  that  they  consider  only 
bivariate relationships.  There might be some multivariate inflation equa- 
tion that is stable over the 27(/2)-year sample period.  But examination  of 
multivariate models  suggests  that the problem persists.  To establish this, 
I began  by performing  a model  selection  exercise in which  I considered 
all 65,536 possible  models  comprising  all of the subsets  of the seventeen 
indicators  variables,  each entered  with  six lags.  Ranking the models  by 
their  BIC, the  "best" model  for inflation  one  year  ahead  included  the 
NAPM  spot  index,  the  price  of  oil,  M2,  capacity  utilization,  and  the 
unemployment  rate.  The  recursive  structural break procedure  in  this 
specification  reveals  three  break  dates:  1974:12, 1981:01, and  1987:04. 
These  clearly conform to the pattern in Table 4.24 
Taken together,  the  results  of the last two  sections  lead one  to draw 
20. These  results  are consistent  with  those  of Stock and  Watson  (1994), who  find  wide- 
spread instability in bivariate relationships  between  macroeconomic  time series. 
21. This may also represent  the imposition  of the Nixon wage-price  controls, which began 
in August  1971, and the end of the Bretton Woods system  shortly thereafter. 
22. See Strongin  (1992) for a full description  of these changes. 
23. Both the  signs  and magnitude  of the coefficients  in these  regressions  change  as well. 
For eleven  of the seventeen  indicators,  there is a change  in the sign of the sum of the 
response  of  inflation  between  subsamples.  For the  remaining  six,  coefficients  often 
change  by factors of 5 to 10. 
24. The  same  result  holds  for the  second  and  third  specifications  ranked  by  their  full- 
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some  fairly strong  conclusions.  First, inflation  is extremely  difficult  to 
forecast with any accuracy. Second,  different indicators provide informa- 
tion  about  future  inflation  over  different  horizons.  And  most  impor- 
tantly,  shifts  in  the  reduced  form correlations  occur frequently  and  at 
times  that  suggest  they  are  the  result  of  changes  in  Federal  Reserve 
operating  procedures.25 
5.  The  Relationship  between  Policy  and  Inflation 
The  real-time  conduct  of monetary  policy  requires quantitative  knowl- 
edge  of the  link between  instruments  and  targets.  For example,  if the 
federal  funds  rate moves,  then  when  and by how  much  does  the price 
level  change?  An  estimate  of  the  impulse  response  of prices  to policy 
innovations  is one answer  to this question. 
There is now a vast literature on identification of monetary policy distur- 
bances.26 One currently popular technique  is to examine a reduced-form 
vector autoregression  (VAR) that includes  measures  of the log of output, 
the log of aggregate  prices, the log of commodity  prices, and a monetary 
policy  indicator,  such  as federal  funds  rate or the  log  of nonborrowed 
reserves.  The structural form of such a model can be written as 
Pt  Ept 
=A(L)  (6) 
Yt  Eyt 
rt  Ut 
where  Pt,  t, and Yt  are the logs  of the aggregate  price level,  commodity 
prices,  and  output,  respectively,  rt is the policy  indicator, A(L) is a 4x4 
matrix of lag polynomials  in the  lag operator L, the  Es are the  "exoge- 
nous"  shocks,  and u is the policy innovation. 
For the purposes  of the exercise  here,  all that is needed  is to identify 
the response  of the four variables in the system  to the policy innovation 
ut. This  limited  identification  is  achieved  by  assuming  that  no  other 
variables  respond  to monetary  policy  shocks  contemporaneously.  That 
is, the first three rows  of the fourth column of A(0) are each zero. 
Given  the results  of the previous  section,  it seems  foolish  to presume 
that the response  of the aggregate  price level  to innovations  in the fed- 
eral funds  rate would  be invariant over the past quarter century. In fact, 
25. It is  interesting  to note  that the  same  set  of tests  applied  to the  seventeen  bivariate 
relationships  of  federal  funds  with  the  indicators  (and  inflation  itself)  show  no  evi- 
dence  of structural breaks in any of the cases. 
26. See Sims (1992) and Christiano,  Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994a, 1994b) for discussions. 206 *  CECCHETTI 
the estimates  in Table 4 suggest  that there have been five changes  in the 
bivariate  relationship  between  inflation  and  the  federal funds  rate-at 
1976:03, 1980:02, 1985:04, and 1989:09. The average length  of a regime is 
under 5 years. 
In an attempt to take account of structural instability, I have computed 
the  response  of prices  and  output  to policy  innovations  from a model 
estimated  using  a fixed  10-year rolling sample.  I measure  prices by the 
CPI, commodity  prices by the Journal  of Commerce  index,  output as indus- 
trial production,  and monetary  policy using  the federal funds rate.27 
Figure 2 plots the impulse  response  for a unit federal-funds-rate  shock 
for horizons  of 1, 2, and 3 years. The result of each regression  is plotted 
on the final date of the sample used.  For example,  the responses  plotted 
on  December  1984 are computed  from  a VAR estimated  over  the  ten 
years  of data beginning  with  January 1975. The top panel  plots  results 
for the  log  of  prices,  and  the  bottom  panel  plots  those  for the  log  of 
industrial  production.  The  results  are roughly  as  expected.  One  year 
following  a monetary  tightening,  prices are usually predicted to fall, but 
by only  a small amount.  By comparison,  following  a policy action,  out- 
put  is forecast  to fall substantially.  After three years,  output  will  have 
recovered,  while  prices will have fallen substantially. 
While the results in Figure 2 imply that the relationship between  inter- 
est rates and inflation  is unstable,  they  strongly  suggest  that monetary 
policy  tightening  leads  to price declines.  But these  are only  point  esti- 
mates.  The estimates  of A(L) have  a sampling  distribution  that can be 
constructed  using  the  delta  method.  Figure 3 reports  the  impulse  re- 
sponses  for prices,  with  2-standard-deviation  bands.  To aid in compari- 
son,  the vertical scale is the  same  in all three panels  of the figure.  The 
results  are quite  striking.  In only  a few  isolated  cases  it is possible  to 
reject (at conventional  levels  of  statistical  significance)  the  hypothesis 
that policy has no effect on prices. 
6.  Policy  Rules 
The  results  thus  far highlight  the  importance  of taking account  of the 
dramatic imprecision  both in the inflation forecasts and in the estimates 
of the effect of policy on prices in formulating policy rules.28  The goal of 
this section  is to compute  several policy rules that take account of some 
of these  sources of our ignorance.  Once constructed,  these rules provide 
27. The general character of the results is robust to changes  in the commodity  price index, 
use  of  an  interpolated  estimate  of  monthly  GDP, and  the  substitution  of  the  log  of 
nonborrowed  reserves  for the federal funds rate. 
28. See Brainard (1967) for a discussion  of this point. Figure 2 RESPONSE OF PRICES AND  OUTPUT TO A UNIT FEDERAL 
FUNDS  RATE SHOCK: 12-, 24- AND  36-MONTH HORIZONS; 
ROLLING REGRESSIONS USING 10 YEAR SAMPLES 
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Figure 3 RESPONSE  OF PRICES  TO UNIT FEDERAL  FUNDS RATE  SHOCK: 
ROLLING  REGRESSIONS  USING  10-YEAR  SAMPLES  (WITH  TWO 
STANDARD  DEVIATION  BANDS) 
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help in answering  some  immediately  relevant questions.  First, once pol- 
icy makers sense  that an exogenous  shock has hit the economy,  what is 
the time profile of the optimal response?  Second,  and more importantly, 
given  the  apparent  practical limits,  is price-level  targeting  really desir- 
able,  or might  nominal  income  targeting be more sensible? And  finally, 
has recent policy  followed  a path that is close to the one implied by one 
of the rules? 
Formulation  of a policy  rule proceeds  in several clear steps.  First, an 
identified  model  must  be  specified.  This  allows  estimation  of  the  re- 
sponse  of the variable of interest,  i.e.  prices and output,  to both exoge- 
nous  shocks  and  policy  innovations.  Next,  it is necessary  to assume  a 
form for the loss  function  of the policy  maker. Minimization  of the loss 
function  then yields  appropriate responses  to the shocks. 
Application  of this  procedure  begins  with  the  VAR described  in the 
previous  section,  the model  (6), estimated  over the sample from 1984:01 
to  1994:07.  Identification  is  achieved  by  assuming  that  VAR distur- 
bances  are related  to  the  underlying  economic  shocks  by  a triangular 
(Choleski)  decomposition  of the covariance matrix of the reduced-form 
errors.29  As described  above,  the monetary-policy  shock is identified  by 
assuming  that no variable other than the federal funds  rate responds  to 
it contemporaneously.  I label the  portion  of the  reduced-form  error in 
the  output  equation  orthogonal  to this as the  "output" shock,  the por- 
tion  of  the  error in the  commodity  price equation  orthogonal  to these 
two  as the  "commodity  price" shock,  and the final part of the residual 
in the aggregate  price equation  that is orthogonal  to all three of these  as 
the  "aggregate  price" shock.  Technically, the  restriction  is  that A(0) is 
lower  triangular.  This  procedure,  due  originally  to  Sims  (1980),  has 
numerous  shortcomings,  but  experimentation  with  an alternative  sug- 
gested  by Gali (1992) yields  very similar results. 
Figure  4  plots  the  impulse  responses  of  output,  commodity  prices, 
aggregate  prices,  and  the  federal  funds  rate to  "output,"  "commodity 
price," "aggregate price," and "funds rate" shocks.30 Each response  func- 
tion  is  plotted  with  2-standard-deviation  bands  constructed  using  the 
delta method.  Two things are worth noting.  First, in all cases commodity 
prices (plotted  in the second  row) respond  more quickly than and in the 
same direction as aggregate prices (plotted in the third row). And second, 
29. See Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and  Evans (1994b) for a discussion  of this identification 
procedure. 
30. These  shocks  have  a very  close  correspondence  to  those  that emerge  from  the  Gali 
procedure,  where  they can be identified  as a money-supply  shock, a raw-material price 
shock,  a general aggregate  supply  shock,  and a general aggregate demand  shock. IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS  FOR FOUR-VARIABLE  VAR (ESTIMATED  RESPONSE,  WITH TWO- 
STANDARD DEVIATION BANDS) 
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for the  three  E-shocks,  the  response  of  output  appears  more  precisely 
estimated  than the response  of aggregate  prices.31 
While  they  are somewhat  interesting  in and of themselves,  the main 
use  of these  impulse  responses  is to construct  policy  rules  given  some 
objective  function.  To see  how  this is done,  begin  by noting  that,  for a 
given  path  of  shocks,  the  first  equation  of  the  model  (6) implies  an 
estimated  value  for the aggregate  price level of 
Pt = All(L)pt + A12(L)ect  + Al3(L)eyt  + A14(L)ut,  (7) 
where  the  "^" denotes  an  estimated  value.  The Ali's are the  impulse 
response  functions  plotted  in the third row of Figure 4. In the context of 
the model  (6), a policy  rule is a sequence  of ut's given  the realization of 
the E's, constructed  to minimize  a particular objective function. 
One  version  of price-level  targeting  is to choose  a sequence  of u's to 
minimize  the  average  expected  mean  square  error (MSE) of  inflation 
over some  future horizon: 
l  h 
min  - 
E(,-  po)',  (8) 
{u,  h  1 
where  po is the log of the base-period  price level,  h is the policy maker's 
horizon,  and  the  expectation  is  over  the  sampling  distribution  of  p, 
which  is related to the covariance matrix of the estimated  coefficients  in 
equation  (7).32 The  us are allowed  to  follow  simple  linear rules  of  the 
form 
Ui=  i  E  jkEjkl  (9) 
j=(p,c,y)  k=O 
where  the  ask's  are constants  that constitute  the  rule,  and  ii  is the  se- 
quence  of values  that minimize  the objective function (8). Taking account 
of the  imprecision  in the  estimation  of the impulse  response  functions 
goes  only  part of the way  toward addressing  the problems  described in 
the  previous  sections.  A  full  treatment  of  uncertainty  would  require 
accounting  for the frequency  and size of structural breaks as well. 
I examine  results  based  on  three  policy  objectives.  The  first,  which 
31. This is consistent with Cochrane's  (1993)  observation  that real output is forecastable 
with high R2  at horizons of several  years. 
32. In the implementation  of this technique,  a heteroscedasticity-robust  covariance  matrix 
of the coefficient  estimates  in the reduced-form  VAR  is used. Inflation  Indicators  and Inflation  Policy * 213 
might be termed passive,  holds  the federal funds rate fixed in the face of 
the shock.33 The other two,  which  I will call active, minimize  the average 
MSE of either price level  or nominal  output  over a 36-month  horizon  (h 
=  36).34 For each rule, I examine  three experiments,  one  for each struc- 
tural shock.  In each of the nine resulting cases, ej = 1, and EIk  = 0 for I  l  j 
and  k 7  0.  In  other  words,  there  is  a  unit  innovation  to  one  of  the 
structural disturbances  in the base period, and that is all. I then construct 
estimates  for the sequences  of {aJk} for each j individually. 
Figure 5 reports the implied  path of the federal funds  rate, aggregate 
prices,  and industrial production  for each policy objective in response  to 
three  structural  shocks.  The  fixed  federal  funds  rate policy  results  in 
consistently  higher  output  and prices than either of the other two  poli- 
cies.  The activist  policies  both  have  the  same  profile,  regardless  of the 
source  of the shock.  Output  and prices both rise initially, and then  fall, 
with  output  falling more than prices. 
Interestingly,  both  of  the  activist  policies  involve  raising  the  funds 
rate  immediately,  and  then  lowering  it  slowly.  This  follows  directly 
from  the  fact  that  prices  respond  slowly  to  policy  innovations-see 
Figure  4.  The  implication  is  that  a  policy  maker  wishing  to  stabilize 
prices  must  respond  to  exogenous  shocks  quickly  in  order  to  insure 
that future  movements  in prices  are minimized.  That is the  argument 
for the  Federal Reserve  tightening  immediately  upon  first sight  of up- 
ward price pressure. 
These  calculations  also  have  direct  implications  for  the  debate  be- 
tween  advocates  of price-level  targeting  and those  who  favor targeting 
nominal  GDP. To see why,  I have  computed  the implied  RMSE for infla- 
tion  and  nominal  income  for each  policy.  For the  price-targeting  case, 
these  are the square root of the minimized  objective function  (8). 
The  results  are  reported  in  Table 5.  As  a  baseline,  I included  the 
calculation  of the RMSE for a case labeled  "No shocks,"  in which  all of 
the uis are set to zero.  (This is a "policy" in which  the authorities  desist 
from introducing  innovations  into the Federal funds  rate, and so it fol- 
lows  the path implied  by the estimated  reaction function.) 
The computations  suggest  that nominal-income  targeting  has  a type 
of  robustness,  as  inclusion  of real output  in the  objective  function  in- 
creases  the  RMSE for inflation  only  slightly.  For the case  of an output 
shock,  the  increase  is from 0.90 to 1.09. But the move  from price-level 
targeting  to nominal-income  targeting  decreases  the RMSE of nominal 
33. As is clear from the model, this is not really  a passive policy, as it involves shocks to 
overcome  the estimated  automatic  reaction  function. 
34. Since the model is estimated in logs, the minimum MSE of nominal income policy 
minimizes the MSE  of the sum of the log of industrial  production  and the log of the 
CPI. Figure  5 INTEREST-RATE,  OUTPUT,  AND PRICE  PATHS  FOLLOWING 
SHOCKS  AND POLICY  RESPONSE 
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Table  5  COMPARISON  OF POLICY  RESPONSES 
Average  RMSE of Inflation 
over 36-Month Horizon 
Aggregate-Price  Commodity-Price  Output 
Policy Rule  shock  Shock  Shock 
No shocks  1.75  1.20  1.66 
Fixed  interest rate  2.01  2.13  2.78 
Min MSE (r  +  )  1.51  0.93  1.09 
Min MSE  (r)  1.29  0.78  0.90 
Average  RMSE of Nominal Income 
over 36-Month Horizon 
Aggregate-Price  Commodity-Price  Output 
Policy Rule  Shock  Shock  Shock 
No Shocks  1.92  2.16  3.25 
Fixed  interest rate  2.78  6.53  9.30 
Min MSE  (r +  )  1.51  1.67  1.89 
Min MSE  (r)  2.64  2.53  3.01 
income  substantially-from  3.01  to  1.89 when  the  output  shock  is the 
source  of  the  instability.  In other words,  the  inability  to precisely  esti- 
mate  either  the impact  of shocks  on prices or the response  of prices to 
policy  innovations  provides  a fairly strong argument  for including  real 
variables in the objective function. 
Finally,  one  might  ask  how  closely  recent  policy  conforms  to  what 
would  have been implied by either the price-level or the nominal-income 
targeting rules plotted  in Figure 5. A simulated  interest-rate path can be 
calculated  by  taking  the  estimated  structural innovations,  the  At's,  to 
compute  the optimal policy responses  implied by equation  (9), and then 
substituting  the result into the equation for the federal funds rate, which 
is the equivalent  of equation  (7).35 
Figure 6 compares  the actual path of the federal funds  rate with  that 
implied  by the estimated  price-level  and nominal-income  targeting poli- 
cies.  Several findings  emerge  from examination  of the figure.  First, tar- 
geting  the  price  level  alone  yields  larger  swings,  as  the  funds  rate 
reaches  both  higher  and  lower  extremes.  In addition,  the actual funds 
rate is  the  least  variable,  looking  like  a  smoothed  version  of  the  two 
35. Performing  the calculations  in this way ignores a number of elements. In particular, 
there is no guarantee  that the policy rules generated  from  the artificial  experiment  of a 
one unit shock in one Eik at a time will be robust  to sequences of shocks in all the EjkS 
simultaneously.  One clear  reason for this is that it ignores the covariance  of estimated 
coefficients  both within and across  the elements of the Aij(L)s. 216- CECCHETTI 
Figure  6 COMPARISON  OF OPTIMAL  AND ACTUAL  FEDERAL-FUNDS- 
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simulated  paths.  But the general  character of the plot suggests  that the 
optimal  policy  response  simply  involves  faster and bigger  movements 
than those  exhibited  by the actual path.36 
7.  Conclusion 
Empirical analysis  of the inflation  process  leads  to a number of conclu- 
sions relevant for current policy formulation.  First, inflation is extremely 
difficult  to  forecast.  Even  at horizons  as  short as 3 months,  and  for a 
sample  including  only  the  last  10 years,  the  root-mean-square  error of 
inflation forecasts is always above 1 percentage  point (at an annual rate). 
Second,  the  relationship  between  potential  inflation  indicators  and 
inflation  is  suspect  as  a basis  for policy.  This is  true for two  reasons. 
36. As  one  would  expect,  these  large policy  innovations  result in less  stable real output, 
highlighting  that the ultimate issue in policy making is still the relative weight  on prices 
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First,  whether  an  indicator  fits  well  in  sample  says  virtually  nothing 
about its performance  out of sample.  Even more troubling is the fact that 
the  relationship  between  inflation  and  inflation  indicators  is extremely 
unstable,  shifting  systematically  when  monetary policy operating proce- 
dures change. 
The  third major conclusion  of  the  paper  is  that the  relationship  be- 
tween  monetary  policy instruments,  such as the federal funds  rate, and 
inflation  also  varies  substantially  over  time  and  cannot  be  estimated 
precisely.  The point  estimate  of the response  of prices to innovations  in 
the federal funds  rate changes  sign over time, and is rarely significantly 
different from zero. 
But policy  makers must make decisions  on a day-to-day  basis,  and so 
stopping  here is not terribly useful.  Instead,  one can take these  lessons 
to  heart,  and  construct  policy  rules  that  incorporate  the  imprecision 
inherent  in inflation forecasts and policy responses.  This leads to advice 
of the  following  sort.  Since  prices  take time  to respond  to all types  of 
impulses,  the federal funds  rate should  be raised immediately  following 
a shock.  One  should  not  wait  for prices to rise before acting.  Further- 
more,  comparison  of the  results  of price-level  targeting  with  nominal- 
income  targeting suggest  that the difficulties inherent in forecasting and 
controlling  the  former provide  an argument  for focusing  on  the latter. 
Data  Appendix 
This appendix  lists all of the data used  in the paper. When  the data are 
from  CITIBASE, the  mnemonics  are in  parentheses  at the  end  of  the 
descriptions.  All  data  are  available  seasonally  adjusted  at  least  from 
1967:01 to the present.  The one exception  is the average-hourly-earnings 
index,  which  is  not  seasonally  adjusted,  and  was  adjusted  by  using 
deterministic  seasonal  dummy  variables. 
1.  Prices: CPI-X1 from 1967:01 to 1982:12, spliced to the All Items CPI-U 
(PUNEW). 
2.  Industrial production:  Total index  (IP). 
3.  Average  hourly  earnings:  LEMXO average  hourly  earnings  of pro- 
duction  workers,  excluding  overtime  (LEMXO). 
4.  Journal  of Commerce  spot price index: Industrial material price index, 
18 commodities  (FCJM). 
5.  NAPM  spot  index:  National  Association  of  Purchasing  Managers 
spot price index,  all commodities  (PSCCOM). 
6.  Capacity utilization: Manufacturing,  total (IPXMCA). 
7.  Unemployment  rate: All workers,  16 years and over (LHUR). 218 *  CECCHETTI 
8.  Monetary  base: Adjusted  for reserve-requirement  changes  (FRB St. 
Louis) (FMBASE). 
9.  Ml:  Money  stock: currency, travelers checks,  demand  deposits  and 
other checkable  deposits  (FM1). 
10.  M2: Money  stock: M1 plus  overnight  repurchase agreements,  Euro- 
dollars, etc.  (FM2). 
11.  Federal funds  rate (FYFF). 
12.  10-year bond rate: U.S. Treasury constant maturities, 10-yr (FYGT10). 
13.  Weekly hours index: Total, private nonagricultural (LWHX). 
14.  Trade-weighted  value of the dollar: Webb and Rowe (1994). 
15.  NAPM  diffusion  index: Niemira and Klein (1994). 
16.  Price of gold,  London  fix: Webb and Rowe (1994). 
17.  Price of oil, Brent North Sea crude: Webb and Rowe (1994). 
18.  Commercial-paper  rate: Interest  rate,  commercial  paper,  6-month 
(FYCP). 
19.  Nominal  GDP: Gross domestic  product,  current dollars (GDP). 
20.  Nonborrowed  reserves:  Depository  institutions'  reserves,  non- 
borrowed  plus  extended  credit,  adjusted  for  reserve-requirement 
changes  (FMRNBC). 
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Comment 
MARK W. WATSON 
Northwestern  University  and Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Chicago 
In  this  paper,  Stephen  Cecchetti  carefully  outlines  and  evaluates  the 
challenges  of  designing  short-  and  medium-run  monetary  policy  for 
controlling  inflation.  A convenient  framework for discussing  the  set of 
issues  that Cecchetti addresses  is the control problem 
min Et  ,  /3i'+,,  (1) 
mt  i=O 
where  wt  is the rate of price inflation (or deviation  of inflation from some 
target  value),  mt is  a monetary  control  variable  (like the  federal  funds 
rate, the monetary  base,  or the quantity of nonborrowed  reserves),  and 
/3 is a discount  rate. The first-order conditions  for the problem are 
Et  E  3iti  t+i 
- 
i=O  amt 
Evidently,  to  implement  the  optimal  policy  a  policymaker  needs  to 
construct  Etst+i  and  Et  7rTt+/idmt  in  addition  to the  covariance  between 
these  two  variables.  Cecchetti's  paper  focuses  on  three  aspects  of this 
control problem: (1) accuracy of the inflation forcasts Etrt+ i, (2) accuracy 
of estimates  of the  dynamic  multipliers  Et  rrt+i/lmt, and (3) robustness 
of the results  to the choice  of the objective function.  The paper reaches 
four important  conclusions: 
1.  Forecasts  of inflation are inaccurate. 
2.  Inflation  forecasting rules and the dynamic multipliers  a'r,t+/lmt are tempo- 
rally unstable. 
3.  Even if dynamic  multipliers  are  assumed  stable,  they  are  imprecisely  estimated. 
4.  An objective  function targeting  nominal income  is more  robust  than  an objec- 
tive function targeting inflation. 
In my comments  I discuss  each of these  conclusions  in turn. 
1.  Accuracy of Inflation Forecasts 
Cecchetti's paper reports large root-mean-square errors (RMSEs) for infla- 
tion forecasts. It shows  that these large RMSEs obtain for commercial fore- Comment  *  221 
casts,  naive time-series  forecasts,  and bivariate regression  forecasts con- 
structed using a large set of inflation leading indicators. The large RMSEs 
obtain  for forecasts  of different  horizons  and different  sample  periods. 
The first row  of my Table 1 provides  results  that are quite consistent 
with Cecchetti's  systematic  analysis.  Letting Pt denote  the date t-value of 
the monthly  consumer  price index,  this table shows  the RMSE of annual 
inflation forecasts,  7t+l,t+1+12  = Et  log (Pt+l+12/Pt+l),  for I = 0 and I =  12. The 
forecasts  were  constructed  from a regression  model  using  lags of infla- 
tion as well  as building  permits and the commercial-paper-Treasury-bill 
spread,  two leading  indicators that Stock and Watson (1995) found  to be 
useful  predictors  for a number  of macroeconomic  time series.  The fore- 
cast  period  was  1979:1-1993:12,  and  forecasts  were  constructed  from 
models  estimated  recursively using  data from 1959:1 through date t. The 
RMSEs are large over this sample period,  roughly 2 percentage  points at 
an annual rate, consistent  with Cecchetti's findings. 
My Figure  1 plots  the  1-year-ahead  inflation  forecasts  together  with 
the realized values  of inflation.  The forecasts are aligned with the actual 
data so that the vertical distance  between  the two  series is the forecast 
error. Two things  are evident  from this figure. First, large absolute errors 
are apparent.  For example,  forecasts  for 1986 called for inflation  to ex- 
ceed 4 percentage  points,  while  the realized value of inflation was under 
2 percentage  points.  Second,  while  there are large absolute  errors, the 
forecasts do track the general trend in inflation. For example,  they show 
inflation  in  the  mid-1980s  moderating  from the  very  high  level  in  the 
early  1980s,  together  with  the  further decline  in  trend inflation  in the 
early 1990s. These  results  suggest  that trend inflation forecasts paint an 
accurate picture of inflation for monetary policy actions. 
Table 1  FORECAST  ROOT  MEAN  SQUARE 
ERRORS,  1979:1-1993:12,  IN 
FORECASTS OF log (Xt+1+2/Xt+l) 
RMSE 
Variable  I = 0  1 =  12 
Consumer  price index  1.82  2.30 
Industrial production  4.07  4.42 
Real personal  income  2.51  2.83 
Nominal  personal  income  2.35  2.61 
Notes: These  results  show  the RMSE from regression  models 
computed  recursively  from 1959:1 through date t. Each regres- 
sion  included  lags  of  the variable being  forecast,  a constant, 
and  lags  of  building  permits  and  the  commercial-paper- 
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Figure  1 ONE-YEAR-AHEAD  INFLATION  FORECASTS 
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While  not  directly  related to the focus  of Cecchetti's  paper,  it is also 
important  to point  out that short-run inflation  forecasts are more accu- 
rate than  forecasts  of other important  macroeconomic  aggregates.  The 
final  three  rows  of  Table 1 show  forecast  RMSEs for two  real output 
measures,  industrial production and real personal income,  together with 
nominal  personal  income.  These  forecasts  were  constructed  over  the 
same  sample  period  using  the  same  leading  indicators  as the inflation 
forecast  and  using  the  same  recursive  procedure.  Forecasts  for these 
measures  of real and  nominal  activity are markedly  less  accurate than 
inflation  forecasts.  Forecasting  macroeconomic  aggregates  is  difficult, 
and inflation is no exception. 
2.  Temporal  Stability  of Forecasting  Rules 
Cecchetti reports dramatic evidence  of temporal instability in forecasting 
rules.  Using  tests  for time-varying  regression  coefficients  developed  in 
Andrews  and  Ploberger  (1994),  Cecchetti  investigates  stability  in  the Comment  223 
Table  2  TESTS  FOR  TIME-VARYING  COEFFICIENTS  IN THE 
INFLATION  PROCESS 
Test Statistics 
L  QLR  EW 
A.  Univariate Tests 
10%  critical  value  1.7  19.0  6.8 
Test statistic  1.3  24.3  8.1 
B.  Bivariate  Tests 
Fraction  of rejections  16  81  61 
Notes:  These  results  are  taken  from  Stock  and Watson  (1995).  Panel  A shows results  for  a univariate  auto- 
regression  including a constant term and lags of inflation.  The test was computed using data from 
1959:1  to 1993:12.  L denotes the Nyblom (1989)  test, QLR  is the Wald  version of Quandt's  (1960)  test, 
and EW  is the exponential  test from  Andrews  and Ploberger  (1994).  Critical  values  were determined  by 
simulation.  Panel  B shows summary  results  from  76 bivariate  autoregressions  used to forecast  inflation. 
Variables  included  in these regressions  are listed in Stock  and Watson  (1995). 
univariate autoregression  explaining inflation and in 17 bivariate forecast- 
ing  models  constructed  from  leading  indicators  of  inflation.  The  null 
hypothesis  of stability is rejected in all of the models. 
Results  shown  in  my  Table 2 support  these  conclusions.  This  table 
presents  results  for a variety of time-varying  coefficient  tests  calculated 
from six-lag univariate and bivariate autoregressions.  The list of 17 lead- 
ing indicators in Cecchetti's paper is expanded  to the 76 indicators stud- 
ied in Stock and Watson (1995), and three different tests for time-varying 
parameters  are considered:  Nyblom's  (1989) L-test, the Wald version  of 
the  Quandt  (1960) likelihood  ratio (QLR) test  for a single  break at an 
unknown  time,  and  the  Andrews-Ploberger  (1994) exponential  Wald 
(EW)  test  considered  by  Cecchetti.1  Panel  A  shows  results  for  the 
univariate  autoregression;  the null hypothesis  of stability is rejected us- 
ing the  QLR and EW tests,  but is not rejected using  the L-test. Panel B 
shows  summary  results  for the 76 bivariate autoregressions.  Stability is 
rejected in a large fraction of the bivariate models using the EW and QLR 
tests,  but far fewer using  the L-test. This difference in the rejection rates 
for the different tests says something  about the form of instability in the 
models.  The L-test is an optimal test for random-walk  coefficient  varia- 
tion.  The  QLR and  EW tests  are formed  from  sequences  of  standard 
Chow  tests  for one-time  breaks in the regressions.  The results  suggest 
sharp breaks in the forecasting  models,  for which  the Chow  tests  have 
1. Heteroscedastic  versions  of the statistics are used.  The critical values for the test statistics 
were  constructed  using  a simulation  experiment  described in Stock and Watson (1995). 
The asymptotic  critical values  for heteroscedastic  robust versions  of the  QLR and  EW 
statistics  are considerably  different  from the critical values  determined  by simulation. 224 *  WATSON 
high  power,  rather  than  smoothly  varying  coefficients,  for which  the 
L-test has high  power. 
Another  way  to investigate  time  variation is to ask whether  models 
with  time-varying  parameters  produce  more  accurate  forecasts  than 
those  with  fixed  parameters.  Stock  and  Watson  (1995)  compare  the 
forecasting  performance  of  fixed-parameter  models  and  a set  of  time- 
varying-parameter  models  for a large  number  of  macroeconomic  vari- 
ables.  Interestingly,  in  each  of  the  76  forecasting  models  that  they 
construct  for inflation,  time-varying-parameter  models  produced  more 
accurate forecasts  than fixed-parameter models. 
In summary  then,  both  time-varying-parameter  tests  and forecasting 
experience  suggest  important instability in the inflation process. 
3.  Accuracy  of Estimates  of  rt+i,lmt 
Cecchetti's  paper shows  wide  confidence  intervals for dynamic multipli- 
ers (impulse  response  functions)  calculated from vector autoregressions. 
This implies  large uncertainty  in the sequence  of values  for Et d7r,t+i/mt. 
These  results  are consistent  with  the large body of empirical research in 
VARs that  has  accumulated  over  the  past  fifteen  years.  This literature 
suggests  that  these  pessimistic  results  are robust  to  a wide  range  of 
changes  in  the  specification  of  the  VAR.  Indeed,  Cecchetti's  results 
probably  overstate  the  precision  of  the  estimates,  since  they  abstract 
from uncertainty  in the identification  of monetary  shock.  Evidently, the 
data do not tell us much about the values  of these important multipliers. 
4. Robustness  of Results  to Choice  of Objective  Function 
One  of the paper's  most interesting  conclusions  is the robustness  of the 
nominal-income  targeting  control  rule  and  the  nonrobustness  of  the 
inflation control rule. Specifically, the paper considers  two distinct prob- 
lems defining  optimal monetary  policy: 
h 
min Et  2  Pt+i  (2) 
mt  i=O 
and 
h 
min Et  (pt+i  +  yt+i)2,  (3) 
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where  Pt and Yt  denote  the logarithms  of the price level and output  rela- 
tive  to  target  values.  Equation  (2) is  the  inflation-price-level  objective 
function  that motivates  the other analysis in Cecchetti's paper; equation 
(3) is an objective function  that targets nominal income.  Let {m2,  denote 
the sequence  of solutions  to (2), and {m3,}  denote  the sequence  of solu- 
tions to (3). Cecchetti's calculations show that {m3,}  approximately solves 
(2), but that {m2,}  produces  a value of the objective function in (3) that is 
far from the minimum.  In this sense,  the nominal-income  targeting rule 
is  robust  (since  it almost  minimizes  the  inflation  objective  function  as 
well),  but the  inflation-targeting  rule is not robust (since it does  a very 
poor  job  of  minimizing  the  nominal-income  objective  function).  Since 
there is no widespread  agreement  on the appropriate objective function 
for monetary  policy,  these  robustness  considerations  suggest  that  the 
nominal-income  rule dominates  the inflation  rule. That is,  people  who 
favor  an  inflation  target lose  little if a nominal  income  target is  used, 
while  people  who  favor a nominal  income  target (and  thus  put  some 
weight  on real activity) lose a lot if an inflation target is used. 
Since this is arguably the most important result in Cecchetti's paper, I 
want  to  expand  on  some  of  the  caveats  that  Cecchetti  lists  about  his 
calculation.  Cecchetti's  calculation  differs from the usual  textbook  con- 
trol problem in two ways.  First, he recognizes  that optimal control must 
be  carried out  using  estimated  values  of the  parameters  of the  model, 
and allows  uncertainty  in these parameters to affect the control rule and 
resulting  value  of the  objective  function.  Relaxing the assumption  that 
the parameter values  are known  is useful,  but it complicates the analysis 
and  interpretation  of  the  results  for reasons  that I discuss  below.  The 
second  modification  that Cecchetti introduces  is a control rule specified 
in terms of the shocks  in the model  [see Cecchetti's equation  (9)], rather 
than the directly observed variables (Yt,  Pt,  etc.). Such a change is inconse- 
quential if the VAR parameters are known,  because the VAR can be used 
to  construct  the  observed  variables  from  the  shocks  and  vice  versa. 
However,  this is not the case when  the VAR parameters are unknown; 
the  exact values  of the  shocks  cannot  be recovered  from the estimated 
VAR. Indeed,  this  introduces  a  logical  tension  in  the  analysis:  if  the 
monetary  authority can observe the shocks for the purposes  of control, it 
could also use these  shocks together with the observed  data to eliminate 
any  estimation  error in  the  parameters.  Thus,  the  two  modifications 
introduced  by Cecchetti are in some  sense  mutually inconsistent. 
A more important concern is the robustness  of the calculations under- 
lying  Cecchetti's  conclusions  about  the  relative  merits of the  nominal- 
income  and inflation-targeting  rule. When  the calculation is carried out 
using  estimated  parameters,  the optimal  control rule and the resulting 226  WATSON 
value  of  the  objective  function  can  depend  critically on  the  assumed 
realizations  of  the  shocks.  To see  this,  notice  that  in  the  control  rule 
[Cecchetti's equation  (9)] the shocks multiply the control coefficients  ajk. 
Since the ajk's  are estimates,  different linear combinations  of these  esti- 
mates  (associated  with  different assumed  values  of the E's) will be sub- 
ject to different  amounts  of estimation  error. Thus,  as Cecchetti warns 
(see his footnote  35), his conclusions  may not be robust to changes  in the 
assumed  values  of the shocks  E. 
For computational  reasons,  Cecchetti's experiments  involve  a particu- 
larly simple  realizatidh of the shocks:  it =  1 for one i and one  t, and all 
other realizations  of the shocks  are zero.  While computationally  conve- 
nient,  this is much different from the historical realizations of the shocks 
or, more  importantly,  the  realizations  that will  occur in  the  future.  A 
more useful  calculation would  average over realizations drawn from the 
estimated  probability distribution  of the shocks.  This would  provide  an 
estimate  of the value  of the objective that we  could expect to obtain for 
the U.S. economy,  and allow evaluation  of policy rules for this economy. 
Cecchetti's  calculations  provide  a  first  step  in  this  process,  and  the 
power  of  his  tentative  conclusion  provides  a  strong  motivation  for a 
more detailed  analysis  of the question. 
5.  Summary 
Stephen  Cecchetti presents  a careful empirical analysis of important prac- 
tical problems  associated  with  controlling  inflation.  His paper presents 
several challenges  for future researchers. First, RMSEs for short-run infla- 
tion forecasts are large, suggesting  considerable  room for improvement. 
Second,  the  inflation  process  (or at least  the linear models  of inflation 
considered  here)  are unstable,  suggesting  a need  for time-varying  or 
adaptive  models  for improving  inflation forecasts.  Third, this instability 
also  suggests  instability  in  the  VARs that  are often  used  to  evaluate 
theoretical  macroeconomic  models,  suggesting  a need  to modify  these 
procedures.  Finally,  Cecchetti  raises  the  possibility  that  some  control 
rules may be more robust than others,  in the sense  that they are nearly 
optimal for many different objective functions,  suggesting  a useful crite- 
rion for choosing  control rules. 
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DONALD L. KOHN1 
Federal  Reserve  System 
A  little  over  a year  ago  the  Federal  Reserve  began  raising  short-term 
interest rates. At the time, inflation was relatively low and not accelerat- 
ing,  and  the  unemployment  rate was  still above  most  estimates  of the 
NAIRU.  These  actions  were  based  on  a projection  that  if the  federal 
funds  rate were held at its existing level,  inflation would  pick up. Given 
the lags in the effects  of policy, acting in advance  of rising inflation was 
seen  as  necessary  to  minimize  variation  in  prices  and  output  around 
desirable paths. 
Anticipatory  monetary  policy  was  not universally  popular  or under- 
stood.  A number  of people  asked  how  the Fed could be confident  that 
inflation would  have accelerated in the absence of tightening.  Moreover, 
this was  not  the  first time policy  actions  had been  taken in advance  of 
economic  developments.  For example,  short-term  rates were  raised  in 
1984 while  unemployment  was  still  elevated,  helping  to  prolong  the 
expansion.  More recently, the Federal Reserve eased policy in 1989 when 
economic  activity  softened  even  as  inflation  was  relatively  high  and 
rising.  More generally,  Steve-McNees's  (1992a) work  on  reaction func- 
tions  suggests  that the Federal Reserve  regularly uses  staff forecasts in 
addition  to recent data to adjust its policy stance. A recent study by Hall 
and  Mankiw  (1994)  recommends  that  the  Federal  Reserve  rely  on 
private-sector  forecasts in formulating monetary policy. 
In this context,  Cecchetti's paper asks exactly the right questions: How 
good  are the  inflation  forecasts  available to the Federal Reserve-from 
professional  forecasters  such  as DRI or the  Blue Chip  contributors,  or 
from  statistical  forecasting  exercises  using  a few  indicator variables  in 
addition  to the behavior of prices themselves?  And, for a given deviation 
1. Director, Division  of Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve Sys- 
tem.  The views  expressed  are those  of the author and do not necessarily  represent  the 
views  of the Board or its other staff. Thanks to Steve McNees and Flint Brayton for useful 
discussions  and material. 
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of inflation  from its desired  level,  what do the data tell us about how  to 
change  the federal-funds-rate  operating target? He also uses  a structural 
VAR model  to look at responses  to policy actions and to test alternative 
reaction  functions.  However,  my  comments  will  concentrate  on  his 
analysis  relating to the two key questions. 
Steve's  answers  to those  questions  are pretty discouraging.  Forecast 
accuracy  is  poor,  and  relationships  among  variables  seem  to  shift  fre- 
quently over time, including  the all-important relationship between  infla- 
tion and the federal funds  rate. 
My comments  start with a disclaimer: they are not based on a technical 
evaluation  of the  statistical tests  and techniques  used  in the paper, but 
rather on the underlying  nature of the tests and the conclusions  drawn 
from them.  In brief, I believe  Steve's  pessimism  is not entirely justified, 
but  derives  in  part from  the  "indicator" approach  he  follows  and,  in 
certain  sections  of  his  paper,  from his  concentration  on  the  results  of 
short-term  forecasts.  Nonetheless,  Steve's  work  highlights  important 
caveats  for the  policymaker  using  inflation  forecasts.  Their accuracy is 
not very good,  and they can be difficult to interpret; consequently,  policy- 
makers need  to be quite cautious in how much weight  they put on them. 
I am neither  surprised  nor convinced  by the problems  Steve encoun- 
ters in the exercise  in which  he predicts  future inflation by adding  one 
indicator to past inflation.  These tests suffer from a lack of consideration 
of  structural  issues.  Indicator  exercises  by  their  nature  submerge  the 
fundamental  behavioral  relationships  among  economic  and  financial 
variables.  In addition,  even  some  of the indicator variables themselves 
seem  not  to  have  been  specified  with  close  regard for a sense  of  the 
underlying  structure of the economy  or theory that might link the indica- 
tor to inflation.  For these  reasons,  the  lack of predictive  power  of the 
equations  and their many so-called structural shifts are difficult to evalu- 
ate,  and  the  results  could  well  be understating  economists'  abilities to 
predict and interpret key economic  variables. 
One  example  is the unemployment  rate. A proper test of the unem- 
ployment  rate and inflation would  focus not on the level of the rate but 
on  its  deviation  from  the  NAIRU.  This  is  particularly  a  problem  for 
subperiods  when  the realized unemployment  rate may deviate  substan- 
tially  and  persistently  from  its  natural value,  or when  the  NAIRU  is 
shifting  owing  to  changing  demographic  trends  or  other  structural 
influences-as  it did in the 1970s. The relationship of the unemployment 
gap to increases  and decreases  in inflation has been tested extensively  by 
a  number  of  different  researchers  over  time,  and  generally  has  been 
found  to  be  reasonably  stable.  Steve,  in  contrast,  finds  four  shifts  in Comment 229 
twenty  years  in the  relationship  of inflation  to unemployment,  raising 
questions  in  my  mind  about  the  specification  of  the  variable  and  the 
nature of the test. 
M2  is  another  example.  Unlike  Steve,  Hallman,  Porter, and  Small 
(1991) found  a stable relationship  between  M2 and inflation (at least into 
the early 1990s), but in an accelerationist context that took account of the 
deviations  of output and velocity from long-term equilibriums. These are 
simply  examples  of how  some  indicators  might  have  performed  better 
with  different specifications. 
For some  of the indicator variables he looks at, one would  not expect a 
stable bivariate relationship  with  inflation,  even  in a fully stable world. 
One  such  relationship  involves  the  exchange  rate. This price reflects a 
whole  host  of  factors  other  than  actual  or prospective  U.S.  inflation, 
including  macroeconomic  policies  and inflation abroad. 
Another,  more  critical example  of a relationship  that  should  not  be 
expected  to be stable is that between  inflation and the federal funds rate. 
Steve's  downbeat  conclusions  about  the  ability of  monetary  policy  to 
achieve  its objectives  derive  importantly  from the unstable  relationship 
he  finds  between  these  two  variables.  But we  know  a nominal  interest 
rate does  not provide  a nominal  anchor. The rate of inflation associated 
with a particular nominal interest rate depends  both on inflation expecta- 
tions and on the level of the implied real rate relative to the value of that 
real rate consistent  with  production  at its long-run  potential.  The latter 
can change  in response  to fiscal policy and other factors affecting spend- 
ing,  but  even  some  of these  changes  embody  predictable responses  to 
evolving  developments,  rather than structural shifts.  If a given  nominal 
rate implies  a real rate that pushes  output beyond  its potential,  inflation 
will  rise;  the  same  nominal  funds  rate could  imply  falling  inflation  if 
inflation expectations  were considerably  lower. Similarly, a given change 
in the nominal  federal funds rate will be associated with varying changes 
in  inflation  rates  depending  on  the  evolution  of inflation  expectations 
and equilibrium real rates. 
In this context,  Steve's  findings  of a shifting relationship  between  the 
funds  rate and  inflation  is hardly surprising,  and no bar to a sensible, 
forward-looking  monetary policy. Policy makers understand  that interac- 
tions  between  the  funds  rate and  inflation  are complex,  and  they  take 
inflation  expectations  and  possible  changes  in  the  relationship  of  real 
rates  to aggregate  demand  into  account  in their decisions.  To be  sure, 
this is no simple  task, and it is prone to error. Inflation expectations  are 
hard to measure,  and  shifts  in spending  propensities  that would  affect 
equilibrium real rates are frequently  difficult to forecast or even  to detect 230 *KOHN 
as they are occurring. Nonetheless,  simply by being aware of the under- 
lying concepts  and the pitfalls in implementing  them, policy makers may 
be able to avoid repeated  or cumulating  policy errors. 
Steve  finds  structural shifts  in all his  equations,  and  he  tends  to as- 
cribe them  to a changing  Federal Reserve  reaction function.  Several of 
the  dates  he  identifies,  however,  do  not  coincide,  in  my  reading  of 
Federal Reserve history, with changes  in operating procedures  or policy 
objectives.  Instead, I suspect  that many of the shifts are a consequence  of 
changes  in inflation  expectations,  of readily identified  alterations in the 
structure of the economy  and financial markets (such as the breakdown 
of  Bretton  Woods  or  the  demise  of  Regulation  Q),  or  simply  of  the 
particular specification.  The point  is that from a structural perspective 
the world  is not as unstable  as it would  appear from the exercises-and 
that some sources of instabilities can be identified and taken into account 
as or even  before they occur. 
With some  knowledge  of the forces at work, forecasts can give policy 
makers a rough  idea  of the general  outlook  for inflation.  Steve  empha- 
sizes  the poor forecasting  capability of forecasts for one  quarter ahead. 
But  as  he  also  notes,  quarter-to-quarter  noise  does  cancel  out  to  an 
extent,  and  four-  or  eight-quarter  forecast  errors  are  considerably 
smaller. These  are the time periods  relevant to policy making,  since it is 
only  broad  trends  in  prices  that  are  subject  to  influence  from  policy 
actions.  At  these  longer  horizons,  forecast  errors for some  of  Steve's 
formulations  are on the order of 1 percentage point or less since the early 
1980s.  Interestingly,  among  the  smallest  errors are those  for forecasts 
using  the unemployment  rate-an  approximation  of the Phillips curve. 
These results are consistent  with experience in "real time" forecasting. 
For example,  the inflation forecasts of the members of the FOMC, which 
have  been  made  since  1980 and published  in our semiannual  monetary 
policy  reports,  have  RMSEs of 1 and 114  percentage  points  for one-year 
forecasts  made  at the beginning  of the year and middle  of the previous 
year, respectively.2 Blue Chip forecasts are slightly less accurate, perhaps 
because  the FOMC has "inside information" on its objectives and how it 
would  respond  to  deviations  from expectations.  The  RMSEs of  Board 
staff  forecasts  for  1980 to  1989 (the  former  date  is  the  first available 
currently  in  easily  retrievable  form; the  latter date  is  the  last  publicly 
available) are somewhat  smaller for the next four quarters (around 0.6); 
errors of  staff forecasts  for the  next  eight  quarters (relative to average 
inflation  at an annual rate) are the same as the one-year errors or some- 
2. The data are courtesy  of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and will be published  in the 
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what  larger, depending  on whether  they  are measured  against  current 
BEA estimates  (that is, after benchmarking,  etc.) or against data released 
closer to the time of the forecast. 
Whatever  the problems  in predicting  inflation,  we  know  that today's 
policy  actions  will  have  their effect over a considerable  period  into the 
future.  From the policymaker's  perspective,  the issue  becomes  whether 
it is worthwhile  to use predictions  of future conditions  to gauge the need 
for policy actions and the consequences  of alternative policy choices,  and 
if so,  how  to  make  such  predictions  and  how  much  weight  to put  on 
them.  The alternative is to run policy simply by looking at past inflation, 
or at inflation and real output as in John Taylor's rule or nominal-income 
targeting,  or at one or a few data series believed  to be reliable intermedi- 
ate targets  or indicators.  Even without  an explicit forecasting  exercise, 
however,  policy  makers  need  some  sense  of likely responses  to policy 
actions in order to judge how  much to change their instrument  or proxi- 
mate  target  variables  when  intermediate  or final  targets  deviate  from 
desired  paths.  Thus, policy makers cannot avoid looking into the future, 
at least implicitly. 
Most  policy  makers  prefer  to  look  at a broad  array of  data  and  at 
explicit forecasts made in the context of a structural model-econometric 
or judgmental.  This is what  they get from the staff and from most  out- 
side  forecasters.  Policy makers are looking  for guidance  as to the broad 
trends  in inflation  and  economic  activity and  to the  major risks to the 
outlook.  Projections provide benchmarks against which  to judge incom- 
ing data to assess  whether  the economic  and financial situation is evolv- 
ing differently  than they had expected. 
In this regard, the structural, rather than reduced-form,  nature of the 
forecasting  exercise  is important.  Policy makers recognize  the tendency 
of models  with a few variables to break down  or shift over time, as Steve 
has pointed  out. Their experience  setting targets for the monetary aggre- 
gates  has only  reinforced  their concerns  in this regard. "Telling stories" 
about why  certain outcomes  are expected in a structural sense is valuable 
because  it enables  policy makers to make their own judgments  about the 
channels  of  policy  influence  and  to  feel  more  comfortable  about  the 
rationale  for  revising  forecasts  and  instrument  settings.  This  is  re- 
inforced  by the need  to explain policies  to the public-an  essential  part 
of  the  accountability  and  credibility  of  an  independent  central  bank. 
Convincing  rationales for policy actions require explanations  of how  the 
actions  are expected  to  affect  national  economic  goals,  and  the  likely 
outcome  of failing to take the action.  Black boxes  do not provide  these 
services. 
As  I noted,  Steve's  work,  however,  highlights  a number  of  caveats 232  KOHN 
about the use  of forecasts-internal  or external,  reduced-form  or struc- 
tural-in  policy. 
For one,  he emphasizes  the key role of Federal Reserve reaction func- 
tions in economic  forecasts.  Private forecasters (and perhaps,  to a lesser 
extent,  the Federal Reserve's  staff) need  to make assumptions  about the 
intermediate-term  objectives  of  the  Federal Reserve  and  how  it might 
respond  to  various  configurations  of  actual and  prospective  economic 
developments.  One  might  ask whether  the Federal Reserve couldn't  be 
more  explicit  and  precise  about  its objectives  and  likely  reactions.  My 
perception  is  that that would  be  quite  difficult.  Policy actions  need  to 
take account  of  a broad  array of the  characteristics of the  current and 
prospective  economic  situation.  In effect the policy  reaction function  is 
too complex to spell out adequately in advance as a mechanical, predeter- 
mined  response  to a handful  of variables. 
Nonetheless,  when  the Federal Reserve is looking at an economic  fore- 
cast, unavoidably  it is in part looking in a mirror-that  is, at an estimate of 
its own  reaction  function.  It needs  to assess  and separate carefully the 
information  of most  value  to it-i.e.  the forecaster's assessment  of the 
strength  of  aggregate  demand  and  associated  price pressures  and  the 
likely response  to any changes  in policy. Again, this probably is easiest in 
a structural context,  where  the policy assumptions  may be more readily 
ascertained  and backed out. 
In addition,  as Steve notes,  even the smaller RMSEs for longer-horizon 
forecasts are sizable. According to conventional  inflation-unemployment 
relationships,  it takes perhaps on the order of 2 percentage-point-years  of 
deviations  of unemployment  from its natural rate to change the inflation 
rate by  1 percentage  point.  So misses  in inflation  projections  can have 
notable effects  on the policy  stance and real activity if the FOMC places 
considerable weight  on those projections. Moreover, the largest errors are 
generally made around cycle turning points, just when the FOMC may be 
most in need of accurate forecasts to damp unwanted  variations in output 
and prices (McNees,  1992b). 
Finally, the evaluation  and use of some  private forecasts is sometimes 
complicated  by  difficulties  in  discerning  the  structure of  the  economy 
and  the behavioral  relationships  they  are based  on.  For example,  from 
1991 to 1993 many  forecasts were  calling for a rise in inflation when  the 
unemployment  rate was  above  most  estimates  of the NAIRU and  pro- 
jected to stay there, since these same forecasts were calling for continued 
moderate  economic  growth.  I suspect  that such forecasts may be based 
on rules of thumb (perhaps in this case inflation on average tends to pick 
up  in  expansions)  that are not  firmly based  in economic  theory. To be 
sure,  the rationales  of many private forecasts are fully explained  so that Discussion  233 
their underlying  structure can be evaluated,  but there is a risk in particu- 
lar when  using  averages  of  forecasts,  such  as the  Blue Chip  or ASA- 
NBER extended  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank of  Philadelphia,  where 
structure cannot be determined. 
For all these  reasons,  inflation  forecasts,  while  potentially  helpful  to 
policy makers, have to be used  cautiously, carefully, and gingerly. Given 
the size of the errors, policy  makers need  to be flexible in revising  fore- 
casts and the policy stance in response  to new information contradicting 
their previous  predictions. 
I conclude  as I began.  Steve  has  asked  exactly the  right questions.  I 
particularly applaud  policy-relevant  academic research-an  all too rare 
commodity  these days, and one that has potential public as well as private 
benefits.  As I noted,  I'm not as pessimistic  as Steve is about his results, 
though  I recognize  the  considerable  risks and  problems  in  the  policy 
process.  Consequently,  I would  hope Steve and others would continue to 
think about the difficulties of forward-looking  policy making and the role 
forecasts  might  play  in improving  the conduct  of monetary  policy. For 
example,  along these  lines,  future research might test the "value added" 
of explicit forecasts in achieving  policy objectives,  as opposed  to reacting 
only to incoming  data, unprocessed  through a forecasting exercise. In the 
context  of Steve's  work and further efforts that help define  the limits of 
our knowledge,  one  might  take a further look at the principles  guiding 
policymaking  in an uncertain world.  Embedding this research in a struc- 
tural context would  be especially  helpful  to policy makers. 
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agreement  about  which  model  was  the  most  appropriate.  Further, he 
indicated  that in this work he was primarily interested in high-frequency 
events  and the appropriate policy responses  to those  events,  and not so 
much in the longer-term  trends in inflation and economic  activity about 
which  structural models  have the most to say. Kohn countered by saying 
that policy  advice  based  on reduced-form  estimation  was  not generally 
convincing  to policy makers; they need  some kind of "story" about what 
is happening  in the economy  to help rationalize their decisions. 
Greg Mankiw  said he found  the paper interesting  and useful  but ex- 
pressed  puzzlement  that Cecchetti introduced  commercial inflation fore- 
casts early in the paper, only to drop them later on. Mankiw noted that, in 
joint work,  he and Bob Hall had found that the commercial forecast con- 
sensus  seemed  to  dominate  other  standard  indicators.  In a changing 
world,  Mankiw  argued,  it is sensible  that commercial forecasts-which 
reflect the forecasters' subjective judgment-should  outperform mechan- 
ical  rules;  this  observation  is  confirmed  by  Cecchetti's  finding  that 
reduced-form  prediction equations lack robustness.  Following up on this 
comment,  Kohn suggested  that the Fed's forecasts from the Green Book 
might  be added  to Cecchetti's  Table 1, along  with  the commercial fore- 
casts, and then used later in the estimation.  Cecchetti agreed that making 
more extensive  use of commercial forecasts would  have value, but noted 
the problem  that commercial forecasts are typically published  quarterly, 
while  his work in this paper emphasized  monthly  data. 
Jim Stock pointed  out that the RMSEs of regression  forecasts of infla- 
tion  presented  by  Watson  appeared  to  be  much  larger than  those  of 
contemporaneous  Federal Reserve forecasts discussed  by Kohn. Possible 
explanations  were  that  Watson's  list  of  indicators  is  deficient,  or that 
adding  more  structure  would  help.  Another  possibility  suggested  by 
Stock is that Kohn's forecasts refer to more recent periods,  during which 
inflation has been easier to forecast. Kohn noted that one difference was 
that the Fed forecast inflation  in the GDP deflator, while  Watson's and 
Cecchetti's  forecasts  are for the  CPI. Cecchetti  suggested  that,  as Fed 
Green Book forecasts are available from 1969 on, one could compare the 
Fed's forecasts with those of Watson and himself for the earlier as well as 
the more recent period. 
Carlos  Vegh  felt  that  a  more  explicit  theoretical  framework  was 
needed;  in particular, there was  some  inconsistency  between  the  stan- 
dard theoretical analysis,  which  treats money  as exogenous  and interest 
rates as endogenous,  and the empirical work,  which  treats the interest 
rate as the exogenous  policy instrument.  He noted  that there exist theo- 
retical analyses  which  treat the  interest  rate as the  policy  instrument, 
and  which  have  found  that  the  short-term  response  of  inflation  to  a Discussion 235 
policy  change  may be in the opposite  direction to that in the long  run. 
Cecchetti replied  that, according to recent research, using  nonborrowed 
reserves  rather than  a short-term  interest  rate as a proxy for monetary 
policy does  not change  the qualitative results about the responses  of the 
economy  to policy  shocks. 
Michael Woodford questioned  the paper's assumption  that the Fed is 
concerned  about  stabilizing  inflation  only, without  concern  for the real 
side  of  the  economy.  Accounts  of  the  Fed's  actions  suggest  that  its 
decisions  to tighten  or loosen  depend  in part on where  unemployment 
is,  relative  to  the  natural  rate.  Subsequent  discussion  suggested  that 
the  Fed's  attention  to  unemployment  might  either  indicate  that  it  is 
concerned  about  unemployment  per  se,  or,  alternatively,  that  it  was 
using  unemployment  only  as an indicator variable for predicting  future 
inflation. 
Martin  Feldstein  noted  that  although  the  forecasts  were  not  very 
precise,  Cecchetti's  paper  showed  that monetary  policy  could  be used 
constructively,  e.g.,  it could  reduce  the variability of the nominal  GDP. 
Perhaps  Milton  Friedman  was  wrong  when  he  argued  that  activist 
monetary  policy must be destabilizing.  Feldstein also asked how  the fact 
that  the  Fed  gradually  raised  the  federal  funds  rate in  1994 could  be 
reconciled  with  the proposition  in the paper that the optimal policy is a 
sharp  tightening  followed  by  gradual  easing.  Kohn  replied  that  two 
factors might account for the Fed's behavior: First, new information came 
in  over  the  year which  led  the  Fed  to raise rates more  than  had been 
expected  at the beginning  of the process.  Second,  the Fed was concerned 
about the implications  for financial markets of rapid interest-rate changes 
in the initial stages  of a tightening  that followed  a prolonged  period  of 
declining  and low short-term interest rates. Cecchetti took issue with the 
latter justification for the Fed's behavior, arguing that the speed of the rate 
increase  affects only  the identities  of the winners  and losers in financial 
markets, and that these distributional effects should not be an important 
policy consideration. 